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I. INTRODUCTION
During the Survey year, the Illinois Supreme Court addressed
issues in tort law that ranged from liability for contribution and
worker's compensation to damages concerning the parent-child re-
lationship. The court discussed the duty of doctors, hospitals,
manufacturers, and owners of recreational facilities. The court
also interpreted and analyzed the impact of recent legislation on
tort law.
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II. WORKERS' COMPENSATION
In Page v. Hibbard,1 the Illinois Supreme Court held that the
portion of a settlement representing a claim for loss of consortium
is not subject to a worker's compensation lien.2 In Page, a trooper
for the Illinois Department of Law Enforcement ("Department")
was injured when a car struck his patrol car.3 The trooper and his
wife filed claims against the driver and the owner of the car. The
parties eventually settled, and the plaintiffs released the defendants
from all claims arising from the collision.4 The parties apportioned
one-half of the settlement proceeds for the wife's loss of consortium
claim, one-fourth for the trooper's pain and suffering, and one-
fourth for all other elements of damage.5
Because the Department previously had paid worker's compen-
sation benefits to the trooper, the Department claimed a lien on the
entire amount of the settlement pursuant to section 5(b) of the
Workers' Compensation Act.6 Nevertheless, the trial court divided
the settlement between the wife and the employer; the trial court
rejected the trooper's contention that he was entitled to the dam-
ages for pain and suffering.7 The appellate court reversed in part
and allowed the employer to claim the entire settlement.8
On appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court, the trooper argued that
the employer's lien attached only to damages that were compensa-
ble under the Workers' Compensation Act and not to damages for
pain and suffering or loss of consortium.9 The Department, on the
1. 119 Ill. 2d 41, 518 N.E.2d 69 (1987).
2. Id. at 50, 518 N.E.2d at 73.
3. Id. at 43-44, 518 N.E.2d at 70.
4. Id. at 45, 518 N.E.2d at 70.
5. Id.
6. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, para. 138.5(b) (1987). Paragraph 138.5(b) provides in
part:
Where the injury or death for which compensation is payable under this Act
was caused under circumstances creating a legal liability for damages on the
part of some person other than his employer to pay damages, then legal pro-
ceedings may be taken against such other person to recover damages notwith-
standing such employer's payment of or liability to pay compensation under
this Act .... [If] judgment is obtained and paid, or settlement is made with
such other person, either with or without suit, then from the amount received
by such employee or personal representative there shall be paid to the employer
the amount of compensation paid .... [T]he employer may have or claim a lien
upon any award, judgment or fund out of which such employee might be com-
pensated from such third party.
Id.
7. Page, 119 Ill. 2d at 45, 518 N.E.2d at 71.
8. Id. at 46, 518 N.E.2d at 71.
9. Id.
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other hand, contended that it could recover the portion attributed
to the wife's claim for loss of consortium because that claim was
derivative of the trooper's suit. The court held that the employer
was entitled to a lien on the entire amount of the employee's recov-
ery, regardless of whether the recovery included compensation for
damages that did not fall within the purview of the Workers' Com-
pensation Act. 10
The supreme court acknowledged that the Workers' Compensa-
tion Act assures the employee compensation from an employer
who may not be responsible for the injuries.11 In light of this fact,
the court reasoned that the legislature was justified in giving prior-
ity to the employer's right to reimbursement over the employee's
right to common law recovery. 12
The court, however, did not allow the employer to be reim-
bursed out of the wife's settlement for loss of consortium.13 The
Workers' Compensation Act allows the employer to be reimbursed
only out of proceeds from an action brought by the injured em-
ployee or his representative.' 4 The spouse's action for loss of con-
sortium was not a derivative claim brought by a personal
representative; rather, it was an independent claim for the spouse's
injuries.15 Therefore, the spouse's loss-of-consortium recovery was
not subject to the lien. 16
The employer also contended that the parties themselves should
not be allowed to allocate the settlement between the employee's
injuries and his wife's consortium claim.' 7 Rather, an impartial
trier of fact must determine the value of the consortium claim. Be-
cause no evidence in the record addressed the reasonableness of the
10. Id. at 47, 518 N.E.2d at 71.
11. Id. at 49, 518 N.E.2d at 72.
12. Id. Moreover, the court recognized that an employee is precluded from recover-
ing damages that are not compensable under the Workers' Compensation Act only when
the third-party recovery is insufficient to satisfy the entire lien. Id. Thus, the proceeds of
the third-party recovery are applied first to those damages that are compensated under
the Workers' Compensation Act, and then any surplus is applied to damages not recover-
able as worker's compensation. Id.
13. Id. at 50, 518 N.E.2d at 73.
14. Id. at 47-48, 518 N.E.2d at 72.
15. Id. at 48, 518 N.E.2d at 72.
16. Id. The court relied on Brown v. Metzger, 104 Ill. 2d 30, 38, 470 N.E.2d 302,
306 (1984), and Hammond v. North American Asbestos Corp., 97 Ill. 2d 195, 208-09,
454 N.E.2d 210, 218 (1983), in which the court held that a wife's claim for loss of consor-
tium is an independent claim. See also Gass v. Carducci, 52 Ill. App. 2d 394, 203 N.E.2d
289 (1st Dist. 1964) (the wife was entitled to the insurance proceeds regardless of her
husband's recovery because loss of consortium is a claim for a separate bodily injury).
17. Page, 119 Ill. 2d at 50, 518 N.E.2d at 73.
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allocation, the court remanded the case for a determination of
whether the allocation was proper.' 8
In Hall v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co.,9 the Illinois Supreme
Court established that a joint tortfeasor need not extinguish the
employer's workers' compensation liability before bringing a con-
tribution claim against him.20 In Hall, the plaintiff's decedent was
fatally injured when he fell through a catwalk on a construction
site. The plaintiff brought an action pursuant to the Structural
Work Act 2' against the owner of the site and the contractor. 22 The
plaintiff also sought punitive damages for wilful and wanton mis-
conduct.23 The owner then filed a claim for contribution against
the contractor and the decedent's employer.2 a Subsequently, the
owner settled with the plaintiff, agreeing to pay a lump sum and to
indemnify the plaintiff for any workers' compensation lien of the
employer, in exchange for the plaintiff's release of all parties'
claims. 25 The parties also agreed to secure dismissal and satisfac-
tion of the still pending worker's compensation proceedings. 6
After the trial court ruled in favor of the owner in its contribu-
tion claim, the employer and the contractor appealed. 27 The appel-
late court reversed the trial court's decision and held that workers'
compensation liability must be extinguished before an employer
can be subject to contribution.28
The Illinois Supreme Court held that an employer can be liable
for contribution even though its workers' compensation liability
has not been extinguished 9.2  The court looked to the language and
purpose of the Contribution Act for support. 30 The Contribution
18. Id. at 50-51, 518 N.E.2d at 73. See Ballweg v. City of Springfield, 114 Ill. 2d 107,
122-23, 499 N.E.2d 1373, 1380 (1986) (the trial court has discretion to determine the
precise nature of the proceedings by which it will determine the reasonableness of the
allocation).
19. 122 Ill. 2d 448, 524 N.E.2d 586 (1988).
20. Id. at 454, 524 N.E.2d at 589.
21. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, para. 60 (1987).
22. Hall, 122 Ill. 2d at 450, 524 N.E.2d at 587.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 450-51, 524 N.E.2d at 587. The release of all parties' liability is a prerequi-
site to a settling tortfeasor's maintenance of a contribution claim against the other
tortfeasors. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 70, para. 302 (1987).
26. Hall, 122 Ill. 2d at 450-51, 524 N.E.2d at 587.
27. Id. at 451, 524 N.E.2d at 588.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 454, 524 N.E.2d at 589.
30. Id. The Contribution Act provides a right of contribution for a tortfeasor who
has paid more than his pro rata share. Section 2(e) of the Act, however, provides: "A
tortfeasor who settles with a claimant pursuant to paragraph (c) is not entitled to recover
[Vol. 20
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Act focuses on the culpability of the tortfeasors;3I an employer's
obligation under the Worker's Compensation Act is based on sta-
tus rather than on tortious conduct.32 The owner had completely
extinguished the employer's tort liability, as required by the Con-
tribution Act. 33
The employer and contractor also contended that even if they
were liable for contribution, the owner could obtain contribution
only for compensatory damages and not punitive damages.34
Moreover, the failure to designate the type of damages in the settle-
ment precluded the owner from recovering contribution because
the "one seeking contribution must be able to establish the amount
to which he is entitled. ' 35 The court stated that the Contribution
Act did not expressly require the parties to allocate the settlement
proceeds between alternative theories of recovery. 36 Although the
contribution from another tortfeasor whose liability is not extinguished by the settle-
ment." ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 70, para. 302 (1987).
31. Hall, 122 Ill. 2d at 454-55, 524 N.E.2d at 589. In Doyle v. Rhodes, 101 Ill. 2d 1,
14, 461 N.E.2d 382, 388 (1984),petition for leave to appeal denied, 116 Ill. 2d 552, 515
N.E.2d 105 (1987), the court stated that "the Contribution Act focuses, as it was in-
tended to do, on the culpability of the parties rather than on the precise legal means by
which the plaintiff is ultimately able to make each defendant compensate him for his
loss." The court held that an employer is subject to liability in tort and, therefore, may be
liable under the Contribution Act. Id.
32. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, para. 138.1 (1987) (employers are liable for worker's
compensation by virtue of their status).
33. Hall, 122 Ill. 2d at 455, 524 N.E.2d at 589.
34. Id. at 458, 524 N.E.2d at 591. The employer and contractor relied on Batteast v.
St. Bernard's Hospital, 134 Ill. App. 3d 843, 480 N.E.2d 1304 (1st Dist. 1985). In Bat-
teast, the court precluded the manufacturer of a drug that injured a child from recovering
under comparative fault principles from the other defendants because the defendants had
engaged in wilful and wanton misconduct. Id. at 853-54, 443 N.E.2d at 1311. The court
relied on the general rule from Farwell v. Becker, 129 Ill. 261, 21 N.E. 792 (1889), that
prohibits contribution among intentional tortfeasors.
An apparent conflict exists among the appellate courts on this issue. Compare Dovin
v. Winfield Township, 164 Ill. App. 3d 326, 517 N.E.2d 1119 (2d Dist. 1987), and
Bresland v. Ideal Roller & Graphics Co., 150 Ill. App. 3d 445, 501 N.E.2d 830 (1st Dist.
1986) (court disallowed contribution for wilful and wanton misconduct) with Pipes v.
American Logging Tool Corp., 139 Ill. App. 3d 269, 487 N.E.2d 424 (5th Dist. 1985)
(contribution was allowed even though the conduct was wilful and wanton).
Also, although the Illinois Contribution Act is patterned after the 1955 Uniform Act,
the section of the Uniform Act that explicitly excludes intentional torts was omitted from
the Illinois version.
35. Hall, 122 Ill. 2d at 459, 524 N.E.2d at 591 (quoting Houser v. Witt 111 Ill. App.
3d 123, 127, 443 N.E.2d 725, 727 (4th Dist. 1982)). In Houser, the settlement agreement
for the personal injury claims of two individuals did not allocate the proceeds between the
two. Houser, 111 111. App. 3d at 124-25, 443 N.E.2d at 726. The Hall court distin-
guished Houser in that the settlement in Hall involved a single injury "notwithstanding
the plaintiff's assertion of two distinct theories of recovery." Hall, 122 Ill. 2d at 459, 524
N.E.2d at 591.
36. Hall, 122 Ill. 2d at 459, 524 N.E.2d at 592.
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settlement did not distinguish between punitive and compensatory
damages, the court stated that both the owner and the plaintiff
would benefit for tax purposes if the entire settlement were labelled
as compensatory damages. 7 Additionally, the record indicated
that the amount of the settlement was at least equal to the amount
of the plaintiff's claim for compensatory damages.38 Thus, the
court is more likely to scrutinize a settlement in which the parties
make their own allocation between certain damage elements, as in
Page, than a settlement in which the parties make no allocation
whatsoever, as in Hall.
III. CONTRIBUTION AND INDEMNITY
A. Liability under the Dram Shop Act
In Jodelis v. Harris,39 the Illinois Supreme Court reaffirmed its
position that the statutory nature of Dram Shop Act liability pre-
cludes a party from receiving contribution.' In that case, an in-
toxicated patron suffered injuries when he left a tavern and was
struck by a car.4 ' After the patron sued the driver for negligence,
the driver sought contribution from the tavern owner pursuant to
the Dram Shop Act42 and the Contribution Act.4 3 The trial court
dismissed the driver's third-party complaint against the tavern and
the appellate court affirmed."
On appeal, the Illinois Supreme Court found that the tavern
37. Id. at 459-60, 524 N.E.2d at 592. Punitive damages are subject to federal income
taxation; compensatory damages are not. See Klawonn v. Mitchell, 105 Ill. 2d 450, 453,
475 N.E.2d 857, 858 (1985); 34 AM. JUR. 2D Federal Taxation § 5334 (1987).
38. Hall, 122 Ill. 2d at 460, 524 N.E.2d at 592.
39. 118 111, 2d 482, 517 N.E.2d 1055 (1987).
40. Id. at 488, 517 N.E.2d at 1058. In Hopkins v. Powers, 113 Ill. 2d 206, 497
N.E.2d 757 (1986), the court determined that the Dram Shop Act created purely statu-
tory liability. Id. at 212, 497 N.E.2d at 759-60. It rejected the contribution claims of
intoxicated persons against a dramshop owner for injuries caused to third parties. Id. A
driver who was found liable for damages that he caused while intoxicated was denied
contribution from the dramshop that had served him. Id.
41. Jodelis, 118 Ill. 2d at 483-84, 517 N.E.2d at 1056.
42. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 43, para. 135 (1987). Section 6-21 of the Dram Shop Act
provides in part: "Every person who is injured within this State, in person or property, by
any intoxicated person has a right of action in his or her own name, severally or jointly,
against any person... who, by selling or giving alcoholic liquor.., causes the intoxica-
tion of such person." Id.
43. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 70, para. 302(a) (1987). Paragraph 302(a) provides in perti-
nent part: "[W]here 2 or more persons are subject to liability in tort arising out of the
same injury to person or property, or the same wrongful death, these persons have a right
of contribution among them, even though judgment has not been entered against any or
all of them." Id.
44. Jodelis, 118 Ill. 2d at 484, 517 N.E.2d at 1056.
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owner was not liable either to the injured plaintiff or to the driver
of the automobile.45 The court explained that the Dram Shop Act
created liability only for dramshops that contribute to the intoxica-
tion of a person who injures a third party; dramshops are not liable
for patrons who were injured because of their own intoxication.46
Thus, the driver was not entitled to seek contribution from the tav-
ern47 because the Contribution Act provides a restricted right to
contribution from only those subject to liability in tort.48
The Illinois Supreme Court's analysis of the Contribution Act's
effect on the Dram Shop Act is sound if one accepts the premise
that "tort liability" is that which was recognized at common law.4 9
Moreover, the court correctly refused to distinguish between the
driver's "injury" for which he sought contribution and the injury
incurred by the intoxicated person.50 The question remains
whether Jodelis represents a limited dramshop exception to the
Contribution Act or whether contribution will be denied when lia-
bility is sought under other statutory schemes.5
B. Indemnity
In two companion cases decided during the Survey year, the Illi-
45. Id. at 487-88, 517 N.E.2d at 1058.
46. Id. The court explained that a dramshop's liability stems exclusively from the
Dram Shop Act when a third party suffers injury due to the sale or gift of intoxicating
liquors. Id. See Demchuk v. Duplancich, 92 Ill. 2d 1, 440 N.E.2d 112 (1982) (widow
and child of motorist injured by intoxicated motorist were not allowed to recover under
common law negligence because they alleged a violation of the Dram Shop Act).
47. Jodelis, 118 Ill. 2d at 485, 517 N.E.2d at 1057.
48. Id. In Doyle v. Rhodes, 101 Ill. 2d 1, 461 N.E.2d 382 (1984), the court previ-
ously held that an employer who was liable under the Workers' Compensation Act also
could be liable for contribution. Id. at 19, 461 N.E.2d at 391. The Jodelis court distin-
guished the Doyle decision because the Dram Shop Act created purely statutory liability
for dramshops. Jodelis, 118 Ill. 2d at 486-87, 517 N.E.2d at 1057-58. The Worker's
Compensation Act, on the other hand, merely operates to immunize an employer from a
tort action after the employer already has become subject to liability in tort. Id.
49. But see Hopkins v. Powers, 113 Ill. 2d 206, 215-16, 497 N.E.2d 757, 761 (1986)
(Simon, J., dissenting).
50. The Contribution Act imposes liability "where two or more persons are subject to
liability in tort arising out of the same injury to person." ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 70, para.
302(a) (1987). To distinguish between the tortfeasors' "injury" in being subjected to tort
liability and the plaintiff's personal injury would prove too much. The Contribution Act
would not be applicable.
51. Some possible exceptions might be the Safety Appliances Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 1-16
(1982), and the Boiler Inspection Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 22-34 (1982), both of which have
been used to impose "absolute liability" upon railroad carriers, but which, at least, im-
pose a species of strict liability previously unknown at common law. See generally Mc-
Coid, The Federal Railroad Safety Acts and the FE.L.A.: A Comparison, 17 OHIO ST.
L.J. 494, 498-514 (1956).
Torts
Loyola University Law Journal
nois Supreme Court held that a culpable tortfeasor was precluded
from seeking indemnity from other tortfeasors. Although the
court declined to hold that the enactment of the Contribution Act
abolished entirely the doctrine of implied indemnity, the doctrine
has a limited scope.
In Frazer v. Munsterman, Inc.,52 the plaintiff sought damages for
personal injuries she received when a trailer that was attached to a
pickup truck in front of her disengaged and struck her automo-
bile.5 3 The plaintiff brought a product liability action against the
manufacturers, sellers, and owner and operator of the trailer.54
The manufacturers and sellers settled with the plaintiff, while the
owner was found liable based on theories of strict liability and neg-
ligence. 55 The owner sought contribution and indemnity from the
manufacturers and sellers of the trailer.5 6 Pursuant to section 2(c)
of the Contribution Act,5" the trial court reduced the plaintiff's
award by the amount of the prior settlement and dismissed the
owner's claim for indemnity. 8 The appellate court affirmed.59
The Illinois Supreme Court held that the owner was not entitled
to contribution or indemnity and affirmed the dismissal of the
third-party complaint. 60 The court recognized that section 2(d) of
the Contribution Act 61 discharges a tortfeasor who has settled in
"good faith" with the plaintiff from all liability for contribution to
other tortfeasors. Thus, the manufacturers were not subject to the
owner's contribution claim because the manufacturers and sellers
settled with the plaintiff.62 In dismissing the indemnity claim, the
52. 123 Ill. 2d 245, 527 N.E.2d 1248 (1988).
53. Id. at 249-50, 527 N.E.2d at 1249.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 252, 527 N.E.2d at 1250.
56. Id.
57. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 70, para. 302(c) (1987). Section 2(c) provides:
When a release or covenant not to sue or not to enforce judgment is given in
good faith to one or more persons liable in tort arising out of the same injury or
the same wrongful death, it does not discharge any of the other tortfeasors from
liability for the injury or wrongful death unless its terms so provide but it
reduces the recovery on any claim against the others to the extent of any
amount stated in the release or the covenant, or in the amount of the considera-
tion actually paid for it, whichever is greater.
Id.
58. Frazer, 123 Ill. 2d at 254, 527 N.E.2d at 1251.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 270, 527 N.E.2d at 1259.
61. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 70, para. 302(d) (1987). Section 2(d) provides: "The
tortfeasor who settles with a claimant pursuant to paragraph (c) is discharged from all
liability for any contribution to any other tortfeasor." Id.
62. Frazer, 123 I11. 2d at 253, 527 N.E.2d at 1250.
[Vol. 20
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court rejected the appellate court's broad reasoning that the Con-
tribution Act eliminated implied indemnity.63
The supreme court stated that implied indemnity is available
only to defendants who are not at fault, but who are subject to
liability because of a legal relationship with the plaintiff or a non-
delegable legal duty. 64 In the instant case, the owner was negligent
because he knew or should have known of the dangerous defect in
the trailer. Therefore, the owner was not able to claim contribu-
tion for the entire loss from the other defendants.65
In Thatcher v. Commonwealth Edison Co.,66 the supreme court
relied on the Frazer decision to preclude a negligent defendant
from seeking indemnity from other tortfeasors. 61 The plaintiff was
injured at a Commonwealth Edison plant while using a defective
water hose manufactured by Dow Chemical Company ("Dow").68
After the plaintiff filed suit against Commonwealth Edison and
Dow, Commonwealth Edison filed a third-party product liability
63. Id. at 254, 527 N.E.2d at 1251.
64. Id. at 255, 527 N.E.2d at 1252. See Heinrich v. Peabody Int'l Corp., 99 I11. 2d
344, 459 N.E.2d 935 (1984) (maintenance company, denying charges of negligence, was
allowed to seek indemnity from plaintiff's employer after plaintiff sued for injuries caused
by his own activation of a trash compactor); Gulf, Mobile & Ohio R.R. v. Arthur Dixon
Transfer Co., 343 Ill. App. 148, 98 N.E.2d 783 (1st Dist. 1951) (railroad allowed to seek
indemnity where its liability under the Federal Employer's Liability Act was caused by a
trucking contractor). See also Appel & Michael, Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors in
Illinois.- An Opportunity for Legislative and Judicial Cooperation, 10 Loy. U. CH. L.J.
169, 171 (1979) (a promise to indemnify also can be implied from the relationship among
the tortfeasors).
65. Frazer, 123 Ill. 2d at 262, 527 N.E.2d at 1255. Nonetheless, the owner argued
that the doctrine of active/passive negligence allowed him to sue for indemnity as a pas-
sively negligent tortfeasor. Under that doctrine, a passively negligent defendant who
merely failed to discover and correct a dangerous condition was allowed to sue for im-
plied indemnity. Id. at 259, 527 N.E.2d at 1253. In Allison v. Shell Oil Co., 113 Ill. 2d
26, 495 N.E.2d 496 (1986), the Illinois Supreme Court explained that indemnity implied
by an active-passive distinction was inequitable. The court stated:
In Alvis v. Ribar (1981), 85 Ill. 2d 1, 27, 52 Ill. Dec. 23, 421 N.E.2d 886,
[establishing comparative negligence,] the court determined that total justice
can only be attained where the law 'apportions damages according to the rela-
tive fault of the parties.' . . . Having adopted comparative negligence and the
principles of apportioning rather than affixing liability, not only in Alvis, but
also in Skinner and by the Contribution Act, the need for implied indemnity
based upon an active-passive distinction has ... evaporated.
Id. at 31, 495 N.E.2d at 500-01.
66. 123 Ill. 2d 275, 527 N.E.2d 1261 (1988).
67. Id. at 278-79, 527 N.E.2d at 1263. The court stated: "[G]overning principle[s] in
this jurisdiction [dictate] that the costs of accidental injury are to be apportioned in ac-
cordance with the relative fault of all concerned in the action." Id. (quoting Allison, 113
Ill. 2d at 31, 495 N.E.2d at 499).
68. Id. at 277, 527 N.E.2d at 1262.
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claim against Dow seeking contribution and indemnity. 69 Com-
monwealth Edison then entered into a settlement with the plain-
tiff.7" The trial court dismissed the third-party action and the
appellate court affirmed.7
The Illinois Supreme Court held that Commonwealth Edison
was neither entitled to contribution from Dow, pursuant to section
2(e) of the Contribution Act,72 nor was it entitled to indemnity
because Commonwealth Edison was a tortfeasor subject to the
principle of comparative fault.73 Again, the court declined to abol-
ish entirely the common law doctrine of implied indemnity. 74
Implied indemnity, however, has little scope after these two de-
cisions. When the court previously had eliminated the "active/
passive" form of indemnity, it reserved the question of whether a
"downstream" seller could be indemnified by an "upstream" prod-
uct manufacturer. 75  Notwithstanding the Frazer majority's at-
tempt to distinguish this situation, there is merit to Justice Ryan's
position in his dissent that the case was "a products liability case,
whether it is based on the concept of negligence or strict liabil-
ity."' 76 Moreover, the duty imposed on the negligent tortfeasor to
discover a product defect is greater than that imposed under com-
parative fault principles.77
Nevertheless, the Frazer and Thatcher holdings may be justified
under the view that the Contribution Act provides a workable
framework for dealing with settling tortfeasors. Any potential in-
equity to the non-settling defendant in Frazer is ameliorated by the
requirement that the settlement be in good faith;78 the settling
tortfeasor in Thatcher could have maintained a contribution action
and recovered most, if not all, of the monies it paid by the simple
expedient of settling the entire case and obtaining a release of the
69. Id. at 277-78, 527 N.E.2d at 1262.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 70, para. 302(e)(1987). Section 2(e) provides: "A tortfeasor
who settles with a claimant pursuant to paragraph (c) is not entitled to recover contribu-
tion from another tortfeasor whose liability is not extinguished by the settlement." Id.
73. Thatcher, 123 Ill. 2d at 279, 527 N.E.2d at 1263.
74. Although the lower courts held that implied indemnity abolished the Contribu-
tion Act, the Illinois Supreme Court considered these holdings to be too broad. Id. See
Frazer, 123 Ill. 2d at 255, 527 N.E.2d at 1252; supra note 65 and accompanying text.
75. Allison, 113 Ill. 2d at 27, 495 N.E.2d at 497.
76. Frazer, 123 Ill. 2d at 274-75, 527 N.E.2d at 1261 (Ryan, J., dissenting).
77. See Coney v. J.L.G. Indus., 97 I11. 2d 104, 454 N.E.2d 197 (1983) (plaintiff's
negligence in failing to discover a defect in the product did not reduce his recovery).
78. The non-settling defendant in Frazer did not contest this issue. Frazer, 123 Ill. 2d
at 253, 527 N.E.2d at 1250.
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other tortfeasor. 9
IV. DAMAGES CONCERNING THE PARENT-CHILD
RELATIONSHIP
In the Survey year, the Illinois Supreme Court decided two cases
that dealt with claims for damages in the context of a parent-child
relationship. In determining whether to recognize the plaintiffs'
causes of action in these cases, the court was compelled to consider
delicate and profound issues, including whether an impaired
human life has value, and the value of this life to its parents.
In Siemieniec v. Lutheran General Hospital,8 ° a divided court
found that the child did not have a legally cognizable claim for
wrongful life."' The court, however, recognized the parents' claim
for wrongful birth 2 and awarded damages for extraordinary medi-
cal expenses.8 3 The court rejected the parents' claim for negligent
infliction of emotional distress. s4 In Dralle v. Ruder,5 the court
denied the parents' claims for loss of companionship and society
for a child who sustained non-fatal injuries.8 6
A. Wrongful Birth and Wrongful Life
In Siemieniec, two parents who had a family history of hemo-
philia conceived a child. s7 The parents sought genetic counseling
and testing to determine the risk of the child being afflicted with
the disorder. The physicians informed the parents that the risk of
the mother carrying hemophilia was "very low," and the parents
79. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 70, paras. 302(c), 302(d) (1987).
80. 117 Ill. 2d 230, 512 N.E.2d 691 (1987).
81. Id. at 236, 512 N.E.2d at 695. An action for wrongful life is brought by or on
behalf of an infant who has a genetic or congenital disorder. Id. The child alleges that
the health care provider was negligent by failing accurately to test or counsel the parents,
or by failing to use surgical procedures to prevent the genetic or congenital defect. Id.
The child does not claim that the negligence of the health care provider actually caused
his affliction. Rather, the child asserts that, but for the negligence of the health care
provider, his parents would have aborted him and he would not have been born to experi-
ence his impaired life. Id.
82. Id. at 235, 512 N.E.2d at 695. An action for wrongful birth is brought by parents
who claim that they would have prevented or terminated a pregnancy if the health care
provider had informed them that the child would be born with a genetic or congenital
disorder. Id. The parents allege that the health care provider's negligent counseling de-
prived them of the opportunity to make an informed decision concerning the pregnancy.
Id.
83. Id. at 260, 512 N.E.2d at 706-07.
84. Id. at 262-63, 512 N.E.2d at 707.
85. 124 Ill. 2d 61, 529 N.E.2d 209 (1988).
86. Id. at 72-74, 529 N.E.2d at 214-15.
87. Siemieniec, 117 Ill. 2d at 231, 512 N.E.2d at 693.
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proceeded with the pregnancy.8s Subsequently, the child was born
with hemophilia.8 9
The parents then filed a complaint against the doctors and the
hospital, alleging that a negligent diagnosis and a failure to advise
them accurately of the risk of hemophilia prevented them from
aborting the child.9° The parents did not allege that the physicians
caused the child's affliction; rather, they claimed that the physi-
cians' negligence caused the impaired child to be born.91 On behalf
of the child, the parents brought a claim for wrongful life and
sought damages for extraordinary expenses for the treatment and
management of the child's hemophilic condition, which expenses
the child would incur after reaching the age of majority. 92 On their
own behalf, the parents brought a claim for wrongful birth and
sought damages for the extraordinary expenses that they would in-
cur during the child's minority.9 3 The parents also sought damages
for the emotional distress and mental anguish that they would ex-
perience in raising their impaired child. 94
The trial court denied the defendants' motions to dismiss. 9 The
appellate court recognized the parents' claim for wrongful birth96
and the child's claim for wrongful life,97 but denied the parents'
88. Id. at 232-33, 512 N.E.2d at 693.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 233, 512 N.E.2d at 693-94.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 233, 512 N.E.2d at 694.
96. Siemieniec v. Lutheran General Hosp., 134 Il1. App. 3d 823, 827, 480 N.E.2d
1227, 1230 (1st Dist. 1985). In recognizing the wrongful birth cause of action, the appel-
late court distinguished Cockrum v. Baumgartner, 95 11. 2d 193, 447 N.E.2d 385 (1983)
from Siemieniec. In Cockrum, the defendant-physician negligently performed a vasec-
tomy, resulting in an unwanted pregnancy and birth. Cockrum, 95 Ill. 2d at 195, 447
N.E.2d at 386. The parents brought a claim for wrongful pregnancy, seeking damages
for the pain of childbirth and the expenses of raising the normal, healthy child. Id. The
court refused to recognize the parents' cause of action, declaring that the "benefit of life
should not be outweighed by the expense of supporting it." Id. at 201, 447 N.E.2d at 389.
In Siemieniec, on the other hand, the parents absorbed these expenses and sought dam-
ages only for the extraordinary expenses that they would experience due to the child's
genetic defect. Siemieniec, 134 Ill. App. 3d at 827, 480 N.E.2d at 1230.
97. Siemieniec, 134 Ill. 2d at 833, 480 N.E.2d at 1233-34. In recognizing the child's
claim for wrongful life, the appellate court relied on Renslow v. Mennonite Hospital, 67
Ill. 2d 348, 367 N.E.2d 1250 (1977), which established an infant's right to be born whole.
The court reasoned that the health care provider not only had a duty to properly counsel
the parents regarding genetic testing, but also should have foreseen the probable damag-
ing effects that negligent counseling would have on the child's right to be born whole.
Siemieniec, 134 Ill. 2d at 833, 480 N.E.2d at 1233-34.
The appellate court did not engage in an ontological discussion over the recognition of
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claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress.98
The Illinois Supreme Court upheld the appellate court's recogni-
tion of the parents' wrongful birth cause of action. 99 The court
found the wrongful birth cause of action to be a logical extension of
tort principles." ° The court noted that expanding technological
abilities allow health care providers to detect abnormalities before
birth or conception.' 0' The social interest in preventing defects co-
incides with the fundamental tort policy to "compensate victims,
deter negligence and encourage due care." 10 2 The court limited the
parents' recovery, however, to the extraordinary expenses of treat-
ing and managing the disorder prior to the child's majority.10 3
Even though the Illinois Supreme Court recognized the wrong-
ful birth cause of action, it refused to recognize the child's claim
for wrongful life. " The court based this decision on public policy
the wrongful life claim, nor did it evaluate an impaired life compared to nonexistence.
Rather, the court merely allowed the child to recover special damages for the extra costs
the child would incur during his adult life as a result of his condition. Id. at 835, 480
N.E.2d at 1235.
98. Siemieniec, 134 Ill. 2d at 831, 480 N.E.2d at 1232. The appellate court rejected
the parents' claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress by holding that the parents
were not within the "zone-of-danger," as required by the Illinois Supreme Court in
Rickey v. Chicago Transit Authority, 98 Ill. 2d 546, 457 N.E.2d 1 (1983). Siemieniec,
134 Ill. App. 3d at 831, 480 N.E.2d at 1232.
99. Siemieniec, 117 Ill. 2d at 260, 512 N.E.2d at 706.
100. Id. at 257, 512 N.E.2d at 705. The court followed other jurisdictions in this
ruling. See, e.g., Eisbrenner v. Stanley, 106 Mich. App. 351, 308 N.W.2d 209 (1981);
Schroeder v. Perkel, 87 N.J. 53, 432 A.2d 834 (1981); Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d
401, 386 N.E.2d 807, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895 (1978); Naccash v. Burger, 223 Va. 406, 290
S.E.2d 825 (1982); Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc., 98 Wash. 2d 460, 656 P.2d 483 (1983).
101. Siemieniec, 117 Ill. 2d at 257, 512 N.E.2d at 705.
102. Id. at 258, 512 N.E.2d at 705. See, e.g., Robak v. United States, 658 F.2d 471,
476 (7th Cir. 1981) (wrongful birth action allowed for child with rubella syndrome after
failure to diagnose mother's rubella); Phillips v. United States, 508 F. Supp. 544, 550
(D.S.C. 1981) (wrongful birth action against doctor for failure to advise before birth of
child having Down's Syndrome).
103. Siemieniec, 117 Ill. 2d at 259-60, 512 N.E.2d at 706. The defendants argued
that no damages should be allowed for denying the opportunity to take an embryonic life
because the asserted injury becomes life itself. Id. at 254, 512 N.E.2d at 703-04. The
defendants relied on Cockrum v. Baumgartner, 95 Ill. 2d 193, 447 N.E.2d 385 (1983),
which did not allow recovery for the costs of rearing a healthy child under a wrongful
pregnancy cause of action. See supra note 96. As the defendants pointed out, section 1 of
the Illinois Abortion Law of 1975 reflected the public policy favoring respect for life.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 81-21 (1979). See infra note 105.
104. Siemieniec, 117 Ill. 2d at 248, 512 N.E.2d at 701. The court extended its deci-
sion in Goldberg v. Ruskin, 113 Ill. 2d 482, 499 N.E.2d 406 (1986), by refusing to award
special damages. In Goldberg, the court refused to recognize a wrongful life action that
the parents brought against the physicians for failure to advise the parents that the child
would be born with Tay-Sachs disease. Id. at 491-92, 499 N.E.2d at 410. The plaintiffs
sought to recover damages for pain and suffering and not for the extraordinary expenses
resulting from the child's ailment. Id. at 483, 499 N.E.2d at 406. The court rejected the
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and the Illinois Abortion Law, °5 which expresses an intention to
"preserve the sanctity of human life."' ° In addressing the plain-
tiffs' argument that the child had a fundamental right not to be
born when birth would lead to an impaired life of hardship, the
court stated that the determination of damages was impossible. 07
The court emphasized the dilemma faced by the courts in assessing
damages: "Whether it is better never to have been born at all than
to have been born with even gross deficiencies is a mystery more
properly left to the philosophers and the theologians .... [B]y
what standard or by whom would perfection be defined?"'' 0 8 The
court rejected the position that life itself could be an injury. 1 9
Public policy favors life and dictates that the child did not have a
right not to be born." 0
child's claim for general damages, including pain and suffering, but left recovery of spe-
cial damages at issue. Id. at 491, 499 N.E.2d at 410.
The Siemieniec court did not allow general damages and, additionally, refused the
child's request for special damages for medical and other costs associated with the dis-
ease. Siemieniec, 117 Ill. 2d at 248, 512 N.E.2d at 701. In denying extraordinary medical
expenses, the Illinois Supreme Court followed the vast majority of jurisdictions. Three
jurisdictions, however, have allowed recovery of extraordinary medical expenses in
wrongful life cases. See Turpin v. Sortini, 31 Cal. 3d 220, 643 P.2d 954, 182 Cal. Rptr.
337 (1982); Procanik v. Cillo, 97 N.J. 339, 478 A.2d 755 (1984); Harbeson v. Parke-
Davis, Inc., 98 Wash. 2d 460, 656 P.2d 483 (1983). The court also affirmed the lower
court's rejection of the parents' claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress. Sie-
mieniec, 117 Ill. 2d at 262-63, 512 N.E.2d at 707.
105. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 81-21 (1979). The Abortion Law of 1975 provides
in part:
Without in any way restricting the right of privacy of a woman or the right of a
woman to an abortion under [the decisions of the United States Supreme
Court], the General Assembly of the State of Illinois do solemnly declare and
find in reaffirmation of the longstanding policy of this State, that the unborn
child is a human being from the time of conception and is, therefore, a legal
person for purposes of the unborn child's right to life and is entitled to the right
to life from conception under the laws and Constitution of this State.
Id. The court found that the legislative policy underlying this statute favored birth over
abortion and recognized that the unborn are human from conception. Siemieniec, 117 Ill.
2d at 249. 512 N.E.2d at 701. The court's reliance on the Illinois Abortion Law sparked
a controversy among the justices. Justices Miller and Simon criticized the use of the
statute, asserting that the court should not attribute a "pro-life" character to public pol-
icy or to the previous decisions of the court. Id. at 265-68, 512 N.E.2d at 709-10 (Miller
and Simon, JJ., special opinions).
106. Siemieniec, 117 Ill. 2d at 240, 512 N.E.2d at 697.
107. Id. at 242, 512 N.E.2d at 698.
108. Id. at 243, 512 N.E.2d at 698 (quoting Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 411,
386 N.E.2d 807, 812, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895, 900 (1978)).
109. Id. at 246, 512 N.E.2d at 700.
110. Id.
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B. Loss of Consortium and Society
Although the court in Siemieniec allowed the parents to recover
damages for the extraordinary expenses involved in raising their
minor child, the court limited the parents' claims in Dralle v.
Ruder.II The Illinois Supreme Court held that in a product liabil-
ity action, the parents could not recover for the loss of filial society
resulting from nonfatal injuries to their child.1 12 The court again
struggled with the problem of assessing damages.
In Dralle, a child was born with various birth defects allegedly
caused by his mother's use of the drug Bendectin" 3 during her
pregnancy." 4 As a result, the parents filed suit for the child's inju-
ries. In counts I and II of the complaint, the plaintiffs alleged neg-
ligence on the part of the physicians and hospitals during the
child's delivery.'" 5 In count III, the parents brought a product lia-
bility claim on the child's behalf against the manufacturer of
Bendectin.II 6 In count IV, the parents sought damages for loss of
consortium and society. The trial court dismissed count IV and
the appellate court reversed." 7
In considering count IV, the Illinois Supreme Court held that
the parents were not entitled to loss of consortium damages for the
nonfatal injuries to their child."' In reaching its decision, the
111. 124 Ill. 2d 61, 529 N.E.2d 209 (1988).
112. Id. at 73, 529 N.E.2d at 214.
113. Current Bendectin litigation has been resolved largely in favor of the
manufacturer:
Approximately 1,650 personal injury cases have been filed against Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals Inc. for alleged birth defects and other health-related injuries
as a result of the morning sickness drug Bendectin. So far, defendants have the
upper hand in a significant legal battle over the issue of causation, winning 15
out of 19 cases that have been tried to verdict.
About 1,150 of those cases were decided in the company's favor in March
1985 (In re Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals "Bendectin" Litigation, MDL No.
486, S.D. Ohio, Judge Carl Rubin).
Inside Litigation, vol. 2, no. 11, at 39-40 (1988).
114. Dralle, 124 Ill. 2d at 64, 529 N.E.2d at 210.
115. Id. at 63, 529 N.E.2d at 210.
116. Id. at 63-64, 529 N.E.2d at 210.
117. Id. The plaintiffs pointed to a number of jurisdictions that have allowed recov-
ery of these damages under similar circumstances. See, e.g., Howard Frank M.D., P.C. v.
Superior Ct., 150 Ariz. 228, 722 P.2d 955 (1986) (parents recovered loss of consortium
damages for brain-damage caused to their adult child by negligent physician); Reben v.
Ely, 146 Ariz. 309, 705 P.2d 1360 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1985) (parents recovered loss-of-filial-
consortium damages for brain damage to child caused by negligently administered drug);
Shockley v. Prier, 66 Wis. 2d 394, 225 N.W.2d 495 (1975) (parents allowed to maintain
derivative action for loss of consortium for blindness and disfigurement suffered by child
due to doctors' negligence).
118. Dralle, 124 Ill. 2d at 68-69, 529 N.E.2d at 212. In Bullard v. Barnes, 102 Ill. 2d
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court looked to public policy and declined to expand the scope of
tort liability."' Without limitations placed upon emotional dis-
tress claims, parties such as grandparents, siblings, or friends
would bring claims for loss of consortium and society.1 20 Addi-
tionally, the court reasoned, the trier of fact would face the impos-
sible task of assessing a monetary amount for the reduced value of
the parent-child relationship due to the child's condition.1 2' The
court concluded that public policy militated against allowing par-
ents to demonstrate that their child amounted to an unwanted
burden. 122
V. DEFINING DUTY
A. Duty to Third Parties
In two cases decided during the Survey year, the Illinois
Supreme Court considered the duty of doctors, hospitals, and drug
manufacturers to third parties. In both cases, the court refused to
505, 514, 468 N.E.2d 1228, 1232 (1984), the court previously established that a parent
could recover damages for loss of a child's society in a wrongful death action. In Bullard,
the parents of a minor child, who was fatally injured in an automobile accident, brought a
claim for wrongful death against the defendant driver. Id. at 508-09, 468 N.E.2d at 1230.
The court followed the trend in Illinois and other states by expanding the scope of pecu-
niary damages under the Wrongful Death Act to include non-monetary losses and by
allowing the parents to recover for loss of their child's society. Id. at 514, 468 N.E.2d at
1232.
Although the plaintiffs argued that the logical extension of Bullard was to allow loss of
consortium and society to parents of a child who sustained non-fatal injuries, the court
distinguished the Bullard decision from Dralle. Although the victim in Dralle retained
his own cause of action against the tortfeasor, the surviving family's only remedy in Bul-
lard was under the Wrongful Death Act. Dralle, 124 Ill. 2d at 68-69, 529 N.E.2d at 212.
119. The court stated that "[t]o recognize claims for loss of society resulting from
nonfatal injuries to a child would threaten a considerable enlargement of liability."
Dralle, 124 Ill. 2d at 70, 529 N.E.2d at 213. See also Baxter v. Superior Ct., 19 Cal. 3d
461, 464-65, 563 P.2d 871, 873, 138 Cal. Rptr. 315, 316-17 (1977) (parents of brain-
damaged child denied loss of filial consortium damages).
The plaintiffs argued that Dymek v. Nyquist, 128 Ill. App. 3d 859, 469 N.E.2d 659 (1st
Dist. 1984) supported their position. In Dymek, a parent recovered for the loss of society
of a "brainwashed" child. Id. at 868, 469 N.E.2d at 666. The court distinguished Dy-
mek, which involved an intentional and direct interference with the parent-child relation-
ship, from Dralle, in which the claim derived from an injury to the child. Dralle, 124 Ill.
2d at 73, 529 N.E.2d at 214. Further, the trier of fact in Dralle would have difficulty
distinguishing the child's claim from the parent's claim. Id.
120. Dralle, 124 Ill. 2d at 70, 529 N.E.2d at 213.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 70-71, 529 N.E.2d at 213. Justice Clark specially concurred with the deci-
sion. In his opinion, the court should have based its decision on Woodill v. Parke Davis
& Co., 79 Ill. 2d 26, 38, 402 N.E.2d 194, 200 (1980), wherein the court held that a
plaintiff in a strict product liability action may not recover damages for emotional dis-
tress. Dralle, 124 I11. 2d at 74-75, 529 N.E.2d at 215 (Clark, J., specially concurring).
expand the liability of doctors and hospitals beyond the duty owed
to those who are in a special relationship with them.
In Kirk v. Michael Reese Hospital & Medical Center,123 the
plaintiff was injured while riding as a passenger in an automobile.
The automobile was driven by a psychiatric patient who, earlier
that day, had been discharged from the defendant-hospital.' 24
While he was a patient, the driver was given the drugs Thorazine
and Prolixin Decanoate, and, after being discharged, he consumed
an alcoholic beverage.' 25 The plaintiff sued the hospital and the
driver's treating doctors for negligence and the drug manufacturers
for strict products liability.'26 The trial court dismissed the plain-
tiff's complaint for failure to state a cause of action, but the appel-
late court reversed. 127
The Illinois Supreme Court held that neither the drug manufac-
turers, nor the hospital, nor the doctors owed a duty to the plain-
tiff.128 The drug manufacturers did not have a duty to warn the
patient and, therefore, the drug manufacturers owed no duty to the
plaintiff, a nonuser of the drugs. 129  The court followed the
"learned intermediary" doctrine, which provides that prescription
drug manufacturers have a limited duty to warn prescribing physi-
cians of a drug's known dangers.' 30 In turn, physicians have a duty
to warn their patients, based on their medical judgment.' 3' The
court noted that the drug manufacturers could not have foreseen
that the physicians would dispense the drugs without the
warnings. 112
Furthermore, the hospital did not have a duty to the patient
under either strict product liability or negligence. 133 The court also
123. 117 Ill. 2d 507, 513 N.E.2d 387 (1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1077 (1988).
124. Id. at 514, 513 N.E.2d at 390.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 514-15, 513 N.E.2d at 391.
127. Id. at 515, 513 N.E.2d at 391.
128. Id. at 533, 513 N.E.2d at 399.
129. Id. at 519, 513 N.E.2d at 393. The general rule of product liability law is that
manufacturers are required to warn only foreseeable ultimate users of the dangers posed
by the product. Id. at 517, 513 N.E.2d at 392; Hammond v. North Am. Asbestos Corp.,
97 Ill. 2d 195, 206, 454 N.E.2d 210, 216 (1983); Woodill v. Parke-Davis & Co., 79 Ill. 2d
26, 29, 402 N.E.2d 194, 197 (1980); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A com-
ment j (1965).
130. Kirk, 117 Ill. 2d at 517, 513 N.E.2d at 392. The Illinois appellate courts previ-
ously adopted and applied the "learned intermediary" doctrine. See, e.g., Eldridge v. Eli
Lilly & Co., 138 Ill. App. 3d 124, 485 N.E.2d 551 (4th Dist. 1985).
131. Kirk, 117 Ill. 2d at 517, 513 N.E.2d at 392.
132. Id. at 521, 513 N.E.2d at 394.
133. Id. at 524, 513 N.E.2d at 395.
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indicated that the hospital was not liable under the doctrine of re-
spondeat superior for the physician's failure to warn. 134 Relying
on the "learned intermediary" doctrine, 35 the court concluded
that the hospital, as a part of the chain of distribution, did not have
a duty to warn the patient-user of the drugs. 136 The court found
that the plaintiff's injuries were not reasonably foreseeable to the
hospital. 137 In addition, public policy disfavors holding hospitals
liable to members of the public at large, who lack a special rela-
tionship to the hospital or the patient. 3 '
Finally, the court concluded that the physicians did not owe a
duty to the plaintiff. 139 Public policy dictates against holding phy-
sicians liable to the public for the conduct of a third party."4
Thus, the court again followed the general rule that a party does
not have a duty to control the conduct of third persons absent a
special relationship.14 1
The Illinois Supreme Court's application, for the first time, of
the "learned intermediary" doctrine in prescription drug cases is
justifiable given the context in which the drugs are distributed and
their associated warnings are given. The physician ultimately must
make a medical judgment, based upon the drug's propensities and
his patient's susceptibilities, as to whether the benefits of the medi-
cation outweigh its potential dangers.'42 It is less clear, however,
whether the doctrine applies when the drug manufacturer provides
inadequate warnings. Justice Simon, in his dissent, criticized the
majority for assuming that the warnings were adequate because,
Simon argued, this matter came up for decision upon a motion to
dismiss and the adequacy of the warnings had not been estab-
lished. 4 3 The majority, however, thought that the contention that
134. Id.
135. See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
136. Kirk, 117 Ill. 2d at 522-23, 513 N.E.2d at 394.
137. Id. at 526, 513 N.E.2d at 396.
138. Id. at 527, 513 N.E.2d at 397. The public policy concerning medical malprac-
tice and health care providers was discussed by the court in Bernier v. Burris, 113 111. 2d
219, 497 N.E.2d 763 (1986).
139. Kirk, 117 Ill. 2d at 529-30, 513 N.E.2d at 397-98.
140. Id. at 529, 513 N.E.2d at 397.
141. Id. at 530, 513 N.E.2d at 398. See Renslow v. Mennonite Hosp., 67 Ill. 2d 348,
367 N.E.2d 1250 (1977) (child not conceived at the time that the negligent acts were
committed against its mother by a doctor and hospital employees permitted to sue for the
negligence directed against its mother). Apparently, the relationship between the driver-
patient and the passenger-plaintiff is not a special one.
142. Kirk, 117 Ill. 2d at 518-19, 513 N.E.2d at 392 (quoting Stone v. Smith, Kline &
French Laboratories, 731 F.2d 1575, 1579 (1 1th Cir. 1984)).
143. Id. at 538, 513 N.E.2d at 402 (Simon, J., dissenting in part).
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the warnings were inadequate was subordinate to the question of
whether the plaintiff was owed a legal duty. In addressing the lat-
ter question and the claims against the doctors, the court relied
upon a less overt policy consideration: the plaintiff's injuries
under the facts of this case were not reasonably foreseeable.'4
Here again, Justice Simon diverged from the majority, even though
both concluded that the famous case of Palsgraf v. Long Island
Railroad Co. I" supported their respective positions concerning the
existence of a duty and of reasonable foreseeability. It may be per-
tinent to recall Justice Andrews' observation in his dissent to Pal-
sgraf that "because of convenience, of public policy, of a rough
sense of justice, the law arbitrarily declines to trace a series of
events beyond a certain point. This is not logic. It is practical
politics."' 46 The Kirk majority made the political decision that the
defendants' duty did not extend to third parties injured by hospital
patients.
A similar result was reached with less controversy and based
upon similar, though perhaps more attenuated facts, in Estate of
Johnson v. Condell Memorial Hospital.47 In that case, the plain-
tiff's decedent was killed when struck by a police car that was pur-
suing a hospital patient. The police were pursuing a patient who
left the hospital after threatening the hospital's employees with a
knife. "'48 The plaintiff sought damages from the hospital under the
Survival Act and the Wrongful Death Act. The trial court dis-
missed the counts against the hospital, and the appellate court
reversed. 19
The Illinois Supreme Court held that the hospital did not have a
duty to control the patient who was admitted upon her own re-
quest. 150 The court followed the general rule that one does not
have a duty to control another for the prevention of harm to a
third party absent a special relationship that creates such a duty.' 5'
144. Id. at 526, 513 N.E.2d at 396.
145. 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928).
146. Id. at 352, 162 N.E. at 103 (Andrews, J., dissenting).
147. 119 Ill. 2d 496, 520 N.E.2d 37 (1988).
148. Id. at 499, 520 N.E.2d at 38.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 506, 520 N.E.2d at 41.
151. Id. at 503, 520 N.E.2d at 40. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 315
(1965). The plaintiff argued that a special relationship existed because the hospital took
charge of the patient whom it knew could harm others if he was not controlled. Johnson,
119 Ill. 2d at 504, 520 N.E.2d at 40. The plaintiff relied on section 319 of the RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, which provides as follows: "One who takes charge of a third
person whom he knows or should know to be likely to cause bodily harm to others if not
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The court did not find such a special relationship. According to
the court, because the patient was admitted under an informal ad-
mission procedure, she was entitled, by statute and by the Consti-
tution, to be released during the facility's normal day-shift
hours. 152
The court also rejected the plaintiff's alternative argument that
the hospital voluntarily assumed the duty to control the patient
and, therefore, was obligated to discharge that duty with due
care. 153 The court reasoned that even if the hospital had assumed
the duty, the hospital reasonably exercised the requisite due care
by calling the police to pursue the patient. 54 This action was suffi-
cient to fulfill any duty assumed by the hospital because the patient
was informally admitted to the hospital. 155
B. Exculpatory Clause
In Harris v. Walker,'56 the court considered the element of con-
tractual freedom as a limit on liability. The plaintiff was injured
when he fell from a horse that he rented from the defendant's rid-
ing stables. 157 The plaintiff filed an action against the stable owner,
alleging common law negligence and statutory liability under the
Animal Control Act. 5 s Before renting the horse, the plaintiff, who
controlled is under a duty to exercise reasonable care to control the third person to pre-
vent him from doing such harm." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 319 (1965).
152. Johnson, 119 Ill. 2d at 507, 520 N.E.2d at 41. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 91 1/2, para.
3-300 (1987). See In re Smith, 145 Ill. App. 3d 1002, 1005, 496 N.E.2d 497, 499 (4th
Dist. 1986) (voluntarily admitted patient entitled to discharge until hearing that changed
the patient's status to that of an involuntarily admitted patient). In previous cases that
held that medical or penal institutions had a duty to prevent patients from harming third
parties, the institutions had actual custody of dangerous patients through judicial- action.
Johnson, 119 Ill. 2d at 508, 520 N.E.2d at 42. See, e.g., White v. United States, 780 F.2d
97 (D.C. Cir. 1986); Abernathy v. United States, 773 F.2d 184 (8th Cir. 1985); Semler v.
Psychiatric Inst. of Wash., D.C., 538 F.2d 121 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 827
(1976).
153. Johnson, 119 Ill. 2d at 510, 520 N.E.2d at 43. The plaintiff relied on Nelson v.
Union Wire Rope Corp., 31 111. 2d 69, 199 N.E.2d 769 (1964), wherein the court held
that the defendant who gratuitously undertook to make safety inspections had a duty to
execute inspections with due care. Id. at 83, 199 N.E.2d at 778.
154. Johnson, 119 Ill. 2d at 510, 520 N.E.2d at 43.
155. Id.
156. 119 I11. 2d 542, 519 N.E.2d 917 (1988).
157. Id. at 545, 519 N.E.2d at 918.
158. Id. Section 16 of the Animal Control Act provides:
If a dog or other animal, without provocation, attacks or injures any person
who is peaceably conducting himself in any place where he may lawfully be, the
owner of such dog or other animal is liable in damages to such person for the
full amount of the injury sustained.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 8, para. 366 (1987).
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was an experienced rider, read and signed a release.' 59 Based on
evidence of the release, the trial court granted the defendant's mo-
tion for summary judgment, and the appellate court reversed and
remanded the case.' 6°
On appeal, the Illinois Supreme Court first determined that the
plaintiff did not have a cause of action pursuant to the Animal
Control Act. 1 6' The court found that the legislative purpose of the
Act was to eliminate the "one-bite rule," thereby lightening the
burden on dog-bite plaintiffs. 62  Moreover, the court concluded
that the plaintiff was not within the class of persons subject to the
Animal Control Act. 63 Unlike the plaintiff in Harris, the class of
potential plaintiffs covered by the Animal Control Act does not
have a relationship with the owner of the animal and is without
knowledge of the risks.'" The plaintiff in Harris knowingly ac-
cepted the risks of horseback riding by signing the release
agreement. 165
The court also dismissed the negligence count against the owner
of the stable because the plaintiff signed a valid release.' 66 Even
though the court strictly construed the exculpatory clause against
the drafter and the riding stables, the court determined that the
plaintiff had equal bargaining power and voluntarily accepted the
risks. 167  In addition, the court acknowledged the public policy
favoring freedom of contract. 6
8
159. Harris, 119 Ill. 2d at 548-49, 519 N.E.2d at 919-20. The exculpatory agreement
provided:
Your signature below indicates that you have read the posted rules and will
abide by them. Also, your signature shall release Ky-Wa Acres and employees
of any liabilities you may incur while on the premises or for any injury which
may result from horseback riding. If your signature is not reliable please do not
sign or ride.
Id. at 548-49, 519 N.E.2d at 919. The defendant also displayed the rules at the stable,
including that "riders rode at their own risk." Id. at 549, 519 N.E.2d at 919.
160. Id. at 545, 519 N.E.2d at 918.
161. Id. at 546, 519 N.E.2d at 918.
162. Id. at 547, 519 N.E.2d at 918. The court, in Beckert v. Risberg, 33 Ill. 2d 44, 46,
210 N.E.2d 207, 208 (1965), established the "one-bite rule," which required a plaintiff to
prove that a dog owner knew or should have known that the dog had the propensity to
injure people.
163. Harris, 119 Ill. 2d at 547, 519 N.E.2d at 919.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 550, 519 N.E.2d at 919-20.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 548, 519 N.E.2d at 919. See McClure Eng'g Assocs. v. Reuben H. Don-
nelley Corp., 95 Ill. 2d 68, 72, 447 N.E.2d 400, 402 (1983) (exculpatory clause in contract
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VI. THE IMPACT OF LEGISLATION ON TORT LAW
During the Survey year, the Illinois Supreme Court interpreted
relatively recent legislation concerning the procedural aspects of
medical malpractice and product liability. 69 The legislature also
repealed the longstanding interspousal tort immunity in Illinois.
A. Medical Malpractice
Section 2-622 of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure, effective
August 1985, requires a plaintiff to file attorneys' affidavits and ex-
perts' certificates of merit when initiating medical malpractice ac-
tions. 170 In McCastle v. Sheinkop,'7' the Illinois Supreme Court
for Yellow Pages advertisement limiting damages to amount paid for services was upheld
in light of public policy favoring freedom of contract).
The general rule regarding the legality of exculpatory clauses is to enforce the clause
unless public policy or the relationship between the parties mandates against upholding
the agreement. Harris, 119 Ill. 2d at 548, 519 N.E.2d at 919. See Schlessman v. Henson,
83 Ill. 2d 82, 87, 413 N.E.2d 1252, 1254 (1980) (an exculpatory agreement signed by an
experienced race-car driver who voluntarily assumed the obvious risks of using the de-
fendant's racetrack was valid); O'Callaghan v. Waller & Beckwith Realty Co., 15 Ill. 2d
436, 437, 155 N.E.2d 545, 546 (1958) (court deferred to legislature to determine whether
exculpatory clause in residential lease was against public policy).
169. In addition, the court further defined the scope of the Structural Work Act. In
Puttman v. May Excavating Co., 118 Ill. 2d 107, 514 N.E.2d 188 (1987), the plaintiff was
injured while working in a ditch that collapsed due to improper shoring. The plaintiff
sued May Excavating Company ("May") for a violation of the Structural Work Act and
negligence. Id. at 109, 514 N.E.2d at 189. May had completed work on the construction
site and its only connection with the site at the time of the plaintiff's accident was that
May leased equipment and operators to the general contractor. Id. at 110, 514 N.E.2d at
189. Thus, the trial court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment and the
appellate court reversed. Id. at 109, 514 N.E.2d at 189.
On appeal, the Illinois Supreme Court held that summary judgment was proper. Id. at
116, 514 N.E.2d at 192. The Structural Work Act, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, para. 60
(1987), places liability on the person or entity "having charge of" the work. Even though
a comprehensive definition of the phrase "having charge of" did not exist, the court
determined that the evidence was insufficient to raise a jury question as to whether May
was in charge of the work. Puttman, 118 111. 2d at 112-13, 514 N.E.2d at 190-91. The
fact that May and its operators did not have any independent authority to direct the work
was critical to this determination. The mere leasing of equipment and operators to the
contractor at the site was not enough to bring May within the operation of the Structural
Work Act. Id. at 112, 514 N.E.2d at 190.
170. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-622 (1987). Paragraph 2-622 provides in part:
Healing art malpractice.
(a) In any action, whether in tort, contract or otherwise, in which the plaintiff
seeks damages for injuries or death by reason of medical, hospital, or other
healing art malpractice, the plaintiff's attorney or the plaintiff, if the plain-
tiff is proceeding pro se, shall file an affidavit, attached to the original and
all copies of the complaint, declaring one of the following:
(g) The failure to file a certificate required by this Section shall be grounds for
dismissal under Section 2-619.
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held that the failure to comply with section 2-622 should not result
in dismissal with prejudice.1 72 In that case, the plaintiff filed a
medical malpractice action and failed to attach the attorney's affi-
davit and health professional's report required by section 2-622.17
The trial court dismissed the plaintiff's action with prejudice and
the plaintiff appealed directly to the Illinois Supreme Court. 74
On appeal, the defendant argued that the dismissal should be
with prejudice and without court discretion because section 2-622
provides for dismissal pursuant to section 2-619,171 which concerns
incurable defects. 176 The supreme court acknowledged that the
trial court had the discretion to dismiss with prejudice and to grant
leave to amend pleadings. 7 7 The court recognized that the pur-
pose of section 2-622, however, is to reduce the filing of frivolous
medical malpractice lawsuits by imposing additional pleading re-
quirements.7 8 In accordance with this legislative intent, the court
decided that section 2-622 should not provide a substantive defense
that would forever bar a plaintiff for noncompliance. 179
B. Product Liability
Section 2-621 of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure, which be-
came effective in 1985, allows non-manufacturer defendants to be
dismissed from product liability actions once the product manufac-
turer has been identified and brought into the action. 80 In Keller-
Id.
171. 121 Ill. 2d 188, 520 N.E.2d 293 (1987).
172. Id. at 193, 520 N.E.2d at 296.
173. Id. at 190, 520 N.E.2d at 294.
174. Id.
175. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-619 (1987).
176. McCastle, 121 Ill. 2d at 191, 520 N.E.2d at 295.
177. Id. at 194, 520 N.E.2d at 296.
178. Id. at 193, 520 N.E.2d at 296. See HOUSE PROCEEDINGS, 84th Ill. Gen. Assem.,
at 385-86 (May 23, 1985).
179. McCastle, 121 Ill. 2d at 193, 520 N.E.2d at 296.
180. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-621 (1987). Paragraph 2-621 provides in rele-
vant part:
Product liability actions.
(a) In any product liability action based in whole or in part on the doctrine of
strict liability in tort commenced or maintained against a defendant or de-
fendants other than the manufacturer, that party shall upon answering or
otherwise pleading file an affidavit certifying the correct identity of the man-
ufacturer of the product allegedly causing injury, death or damage ....
(b) Once the plaintiff has filed a complaint against the manufacturer or manu-
facturers, and the manufacturer or manufacturers have or are required to
have answered or otherwise pleaded, the court shall order the dismissal of a
strict liability in tort claim against the certifying defendant or defendants,
1989]
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man v. Crowe,"' the Illinois Supreme Court held that dismissals
pursuant to section 2-621 cannot be made final and appealable be-
cause section 2-621 does not dispose of the rights of the parties to
the action.i8 2
In Kellerman, several people died from poisoned Tylenol
purchased at Jewel and Woolworth stores. 183 The plaintiffs filed
product liability actions against the stores, which then moved for
dismissal pursuant to section 2-621.Is Subsequently, the trial court
granted the dismissals and made the orders final and appealable.'8 "
The Illinois Supreme Court held that such orders are not final
and appealable. 86 The court also concluded that dismissals with
prejudice would limit severely a plaintiff's ability to reinstate cases
and would enlarge the limited benefit to non-manufacturers that
the legislature intended section 2-621 to provide.'87
C. Interspousal Immunity
The Illinois Legislature amended the law of interspousal immu-
nity with Public Act 85-625.188 Previously, one spouse could not
sue the other for a tort committed during the marriage.'89 As of
January 1, 1988, spouses may sue each other for a tort committed
during the marriage. 90
provided the certifying defendant or defendants are not within the catego-
ries set forth in subsection (c) of this Section.
Id.
181. 119 Ill. 2d 111, 518 N.E.2d 116 (1987).
182. Id. at 115, 518 N.E.2d at 118. Section 2-621 permits a non-manufacturer to be
dismissed from a product liability action to avoid the costs of defense by filing an affidavit
certifying the correct manufacturer of the product. Id. at 116, 518 N.E.2d at 119. In
addition, the non-manufacturer must not be responsible for or have knowledge of the
defect. Id. The plaintiff can move to have the dismissal vacated and reinstate the non-
manufacturer as a defendant if an action against the manufacturer would be fruitless. Id.
at 117, 518 N.E.2d at 119.
183. Id. at 113, 518 N.E.2d at 117.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 112, 518 N.E.2d at 117.
186. Id. at 115, 518 N.E.2d at 118.
187. Id. at 116, 518 N.E.2d at 118.
188. See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, para. 1001 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1988).
189. Before Public Act 85-625 became effective in 1988, the Illinois Supreme Court
decided Nelson v. Hix, 122 Ill. 2d 343, 522 N.E.2d 1214 (1988). In Nelson, the court
permitted a wife to sue her husband in tort. Id. at 353, 522 N.E.2d at 1219. The court
followed Canadian law, the law of the domicile of the couple, although Illinois law main-
tained spousal immunity at the time. Id.
190. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, para. 1001 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1988). Paragraph 1001
provides:
A married woman may, in all cases, sue and be sued without joining her hus-
band with her, to the same extent as if she were unmarried. A husband or wife
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VII. CONCLUSION
During the Survey year, the Illinois Supreme Court confronted
issues of significance to tort law. Perhaps the most important deci-
sions involved the court's refusal to recognize any damages for a
wrongful life cause of action and its limitation of damages for
wrongful birth claims. Also, the court continued to balance the
effect of settlements and contribution claims upon those liable
under the Workers' Compensation Act, and it recognized the
"learned intermediary" defense for drug manufacturers. As some
jurisdictions take contrasting positions to the Illinois Supreme
Court's decisions, the court may be confronted with variations of
these issues in the future.
may sue the other for a tort committed during the marriage. No finding by any
court under Section 401 of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage
Act shall be admissible or be used as prima facie evidence of a tort in any civil
action brought pursuant to the provisions of this Act. An attachment or judg-
ment in such action may be enforced by or against her as if she were a single
woman.
Id. (emphasis added).
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